High Court, in proceedings concerning whether parents’ of a minor who has applied for international protection had a right to work, dismisses the application for damages, on the grounds that: the decision to refuse to grant labour market access permissions to the parents was lawful, on the grounds that an applicant for international protection who is a child does not obtain any greater rights than a child who is an Irish or EU citizen would enjoy; the parents did not have a derived right to work to ensure that their child had an adequate standard of living during the pendency of his application; and there was no breach of any constitutional right
Asylum and immigration – judicial review - circumstances in which an individual, who has made an application under the International Protection Act 2015, has a right to work in the Irish State pending the determination of that application – argued that where the applicant for international protection is a child, and thus cannot lawfully work himself, the Irish State is under an obligation to provide labour market access to the child’s parents – argued that in order for the child’s supposed right of access to the labour market to be effective, it is necessary that it be exercised vicariously by his parents – procedural history – parents applications for international protection unsuccessful - immigration status in the Irish State was precarious and they were subject to (unexecuted) deportation orders - parents’ immigration status has since been regularised – Stamp 4 permission - parents were not permitted to work lawfully within the Irish State – child’s application for international protection not determined – subsequent to the hearing of the proceedings child’s application for international protection had been successful - claimants were directed to provide further and better particulars of their claim for damages – legislative framework – mootness - continues to be a live controversy in these judicial review proceedings in that the parents seek to recover damages against the Irish State for the period during which they were not permitted to access the labour market - principles governing the doctrine of mootness - whether there is or remains at the date of hearing a live, unresolved and concrete legal dispute between the parties, or whether, alternatively, the action is speculative or seeks an advisory decision from the court which could be of no practical effect – Court determined that these judicial review proceedings should be determined notwithstanding that the claimants’ immigration status has since been regularised - over rigid application of the doctrine of mootness might result in the legal issues arising evading capture because same will often have “timed out” - remains a live controversy between the parties in respect of the claim for damages - Francovich damages – a vicarious right to work - any application for a labour market access permission on behalf of a child of eighteen months would have to be refused precisely because the child is not entitled to work by reason of his tender years - an applicant for international protection who is a child does not obtain any greater rights than a child, who is an Irish citizen or an EU citizen, would enjoy - neither is entitled to work lawfully in the Irish State until they reach the age of 14 years - claimants’ case is predicated on a false premise – the decision to refuse to grant labour market access permissions to the parents was lawful - right of access to the labour market is personal to the individual applicant for international protection – a derived right to work - argument overlooks the fact that the Reception Conditions Directive imposes the obligation upon the Member State to ensure that material reception conditions (including housing, food, clothing and education) are made available to a minor applicant - a minor applicant for international protection, falls within the definition of a “vulnerable person” - Member States are required to assess whether the child is an applicant with special reception needs - Member States are required to ensure a standard of living adequate for the minor’s physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social development - assessing the best interests of a minor applicant - fallacy underlying the claimants’ case is that there is a necessity to supplement this comprehensive suite of protections by “reading into” Article 15 of the Reception Conditions Directive a rider to the effect that the parents of a minor applicant must be allowed work in order to ensure that the child has an adequate standard of living - Reception Conditions Directive does not require Member States to extend access to the labour market to persons, who are not otherwise entitled to access - constitutional right to seek employment - imposition of a restriction preventing children from working is well within the margin of appreciation of the legislature – proceedings dismissed –