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High Court, in personal injury proceedings, makes orders by consent striking out the plaintiff’s claim with an order that the plaintiff’s claim for loss of earnings be limited to €16,960.00, representing fifty percent of the relevant claim which had been agreed, on the grounds that: a court can make a consent order apportioning liability in a personal injury action even where it is sought solely for the purpose of a social welfare statutory provision; and that the contrary interpretation - that ‘an order of the court’ denotes a hearing “after hearing evidence under cross-examination in an adversarial hearing” - is manifestly not provided for in the relevant subsection, and such a reading would have the alarming consequence of requiring parties to a personal injury action to litigate for days where they have been lawfully agreed.
Personal injuries – practice and procedure – action settled - applied by consent for an order striking out the plaintiff’s claim with an order directing the adjudication of the plaintiff’s costs to include reserved and discovery costs in default of agreement together with an order that the plaintiff’s claim for loss of earnings be limited to €16,960.00, representing fifty percent of the relevant claim which had been agreed because of a causation issue regarding the plaintiff’s injury - controversy in recent jurisprudence of the High Court in which contradictory interpretations have been given to the provisions of s.343R (2) of the Social Welfare (Consolidation) Act, 2005 - directed the defendant to give notice to the Minister for Social Protection – reasons for preferring the reasoning that states that consent orders can be made - Jurisdiction to make a consent order for the apportionment of liability in a personal injury case prior to the commencement of s.343R of the Act of 2005 - an award of damages for personal injuries is a private law remedy - function of the court in such a case is not to compel the parties to litigate that which has been agreed but rather to determine that which cannot be agreed and otherwise to make such orders as are necessary or required to reflect such agreement as there is between the parties - satisfied that where such an order was made by consent it was no less ‘an order of a court’ than an order that was made after an uncontested, partially contested or fully contested hearing - whether the jurisdiction was removed or affected by s.343R (2) of the Act of 2005 - s.343R (2) of the Act of 2005 does not remove or in any way affect any existing jurisdiction to make such an order whether it is made by consent or otherwise - Whether a consent order for the apportionment of liability can be properly made where it is sought solely for the purpose of s.343R (2) of the Act of 2005 – suggestion that ‘an order of the court’ denotes a hearing “after hearing evidence under cross-examination in an adversarial hearing” is manifestly not provided for in the subsection - such a reading of the Act is unwarranted by the wording of the subsection and would have the alarming consequence of requiring parties to a personal injury action to litigate for days, perhaps even weeks, cases or issues upon which they are lawfully and properly agreed – nothing in the words of the Act of 2005, even when considered as a whole, which requires a court to deprive litigants in a personal injury action of their entitlement to adjust their differences in relation to any claim that is made within the proceedings for less than full value and to seek an order of the court that reflects their lawful agreement - Court satisfied that a court can make a consent order apportioning liability in a personal injury action even where it is sought solely for the purpose of s.343R (2) of the Act of 2005 .
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